Distributed ledger technology o ers numerous desirable attributes to applications in the enterprise context. However, with distributed data and decentralized computation on a shared platform, privacy and con dentiality challenges arise. Any design for an enterprise system needs to carefully cater for use case speci c privacy and con dentiality needs. With the goal to facilitate the design of enterprise solutions, this paper aims to provide a guide to navigate and aid in decisions around common requirements and mechanisms that prevent the leakage of private and con dential information. To further contextualize key concepts, the design guide is then applied to three enterprise DLT protocols: Hyperledger Fabric, Corda, and orum.
Introduction
Distributed ledger technology (DLT) and blockchain in particular are widely known as the technologies behind digital asset platforms such as Bitcoin [21] and Ethereum [7] . ese decentralized protocols o er parties the ability to record the exchange of assets and data on an append-only ledger without the involvement of a central authority. e promise of DLT is to provide a secure and tamper-proof record of every transaction that has ever taken place on a shared network. Applications of this technology, however, are not limited to the management of assets in the public domain. * Both authors contributed equally to this research.
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for pro t or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the rst page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permi ed. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior speci c permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. In the enterprise context, permissioned DLTs can assist with a number of otherwise hard to manage issues. Shared ledgers facilitate an audit of past transactions, aid in contract litigation, record consent of parties via digital signatures, and can be used to transparently execute shared and versioncontrolled business logic. However, having data replicated across multiple entities inherently poses challenges for the preservation of privacy and con dentiality. While similar, albeit use case dependent, challenges arise in both public and permissioned ledgers, it can be the legal, regulatory, or contractual requirements that demand particular diligence for the design of enterprise solutions.
In this paper, we will address privacy and con dentiality for (a) the group of interacting parties, (b) transaction data, and (c) business logic. While public DLTs place a strong focus on pseudonymity, in a permissioned ledger revealing an identity may not only be acceptable but is o en a legal requirement. However, not all businesses may want their relationships with other parties to be visible to unauthorised network members, meaning that enterprise DLT platforms may need to o er the possibility to keep interactions private. Moreover, data may be strategic to the participating business entities or be sensitive, such as customer data or Personally Identifying Information (PII) (Social Security Numbers, passport details, driver's licenses, etc). In public blockchains the logic that controls state updates can be fully transparent (as in Bitcoin) or revealed as bytecode (as in Ethereum) with execution of the logic and its results made public. Meanwhile, for enterprise use cases, any business logic may contain sensitive business information, requiring that code is not shared with all network participants.
In an enterprise solution, the speci c use case will determine the privacy and con dentiality requirements of the architecture. Catering to these requires the architect to navigate a vast space of possible privacy and con dentiality preserving mechanisms. To facilitate the design of enterprise solutions, the following paper aims to serve as a design guide for systems in the enterprise context that are built on distributed ledger technology. is paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes mechanisms to preserve privacy of interactions, con dentiality of transactions and data, and con dentiality of business processes. A guide for assessing DLT platforms with respect to their ability to meet speci c enterprise requirements is provided in Section 3, that is subsequently applied to the use case of le ers of credit in Section 4. Section 5 describes how privacy and con dentiality are addressed in the three largest DLTs for enterprise: Hyperledger Fabric (HLF) [3] , Corda [14] , and orum [15] . e paper is concluded in Section 6 with some nal remarks.
Privacy and Con dentiality Mechanisms
e following provides a reference to mechanisms that can be deployed to preserve privacy and con dentiality in DLT solutions, with a particular focus on their utility in enterprise solutions. Privacy is used in the context of identity protection of individual parties as well as participants of a transaction. Con dentiality is used when relating to the protection of data or business logic. e available mechanisms to preserve privacy and con dentiality across solutions reach from structural design considerations to the use of cryptography.
Privacy of interactions
e veri cation of identities of parties onboarded to the platform is a common requirement of enterprise blockchain solutions. is function is usually carried out by a service that allows parties to map public keys to identities through public key infrastructure (PKI) [23] .
is service may optionally expose a global membership list so that parties may establish relationships. However, the group of parties entering into a business relationship o en needs to be kept private from the wider network.
Separation of ledgers A network can be set up with not one global, but several private ledgers, where each is responsible for facilitating transactions between interacting parties. is segregation can be established as a permanent network structure that holds a separate ledger as its own blockchain [3] . or on a per-transaction basis [14] , where data are sent only to involved parties.
One-time public keys In DLT platforms where ownership of assets is recorded against an address derived from a public key, one-time public keys can be used to mask the identity of the asset owner [14] . Transacting parties and any entity that needs to verify signatures are then provided with a certi cate that links the pseudonymous public key with an identity.
Zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) of identity ZKP is a cryptographic technique that can be used to prove that a party has a particular piece of information, or that a certain condition is met, without revealing the information itself. In the context of identity, ZKPs can be used to prove the possession of a set of credentials without exposing the identity [8] . Using ZKPs, digital signatures from a party can be completely unlinkable to each other and to an identity.
Con dentiality of transactions and data
Transaction data are at the center of most business interactions. Such data can contain trade secrets, nancial records, or otherwise private agreements that may be sensitive not only to businesses but also to their clients.
Separation of ledgers
Similarly to the way the separation of ledgers can provide privacy for interacting parties, it also provides con dentiality of data, revealing transaction data only to parties within the network partition. If a public record of the existence of a transaction is required, a hash of transaction data may optionally be published on a shared ledger.
O -chain data In cases where data need to be kept condential to a subset of participants within a ledger, private data can be kept in an o -chain database. is can either be natively integrated and hosted on a peer (peer o -chain), or be kept separate from the DLT layer entirely. Transactions on the ledger can contain a hash of the o -chain data to provide authoritative evidence and an accompanying audit trail for involved parties to verify the provenance of private data. Storing data o -chain has the additional property of enabling data to be deleted, for example, if required by law [10] . However, allowing data deletion is in some way contradictory to the promise of an immutable, auditable record.
Symmetric key encryption Symmetric key encryption, for example the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [22] , can be used to keep data con dential by encrypting values with a shared key between parties, which commonly gets shared over the network using PKI. In order to implement this mechanism, use case and geographical region need to permit the sharing of encrypted data.
Merkle tree tear-o s One way of eliminating the need to share all data with all counterparties is to use a method called Merkle tree tear-o s [19] . A Merkle tree is a data structure where every leaf is a hash of data, and every nonleaf node is a hash of the combined hashes of its child nodes. In some DLTs, parties that are required to sign a transaction do so on the root of the Merkle tree constructed from all the transaction contents. If some data within the transaction needs to be kept con dential from a party, the root of the con dential branch can be provided to them. e party is able to compute and sign on the Merkle root without having access to the con dential data.
Multiparty computation Multiparty computation (MPC) [9] describes a collection of cryptographic algorithms that allows a group of parties to compute a shared function on private values. Each party carries out a computation on their private data and shares the result with the other parties. All collected results are then used by each party to compute the same shared function, resulting in one consistent value that can be commi ed to the ledger. In DLT, this means that no private values need to be shared between parties and each participant would be able to store their data o -chain. All functions and algorithms performed on the data are known to all involved parties.
Zero-knowledge proofs In the context of data con dentiality, a ZKP can be used to only provide enough information to prove that a certain fact is true (e.g. "the party has the appropriate funds") without revealing raw values [13] . In enterprise DLTs, this becomes relevant when a precondition needs to be met before a smart contract will authorize and carry out a certain transaction, but the party in question does not want to reveal information beyond a boolean a rmation. ZKPs need to be implemented speci cally for a scenario and are currently only available for very speci c functions [20] .
Homomorphic computation Homomorphic encryption [12] describes cryptographic methods that allow for the computation of certain functions on encrypted input parameters to produce an equally encrypted output. In theory this means that any party can carry out the computation on input data, vouch for correct execution, and thus be part of validation of transactions without being able to inspect any raw values. Since homomorphic computation is still in the proof-of-concept stage and, moreover, has only been shown to enable a very limited set of operations, this method is infeasible for implementation in current systems [16] .
Trusted execution environments Trusted execution environments (TEEs) are hardware security modules within a CPU that guarantee con dentiality of executable code and data inside it [2] . Programs inside TEEs are physically isolated from the rest of the CPU, meaning no other so ware can access or modify them. Each TEE owns a set of private keys that are embedded in the chip during manufacturing, with the corresponding public keys held by the manufacturer.
e TEE can provide an a estation of its state and the code running inside it, that can be signed by its private key, and is veri able by the public key. ese features of TEEs mean they can be used to run smart contract code in a way that will keep both the code itself and the data around the smart contracts con dential. Larger platforms have only recently started experimenting with TEEs [6] [17].
2.3 Con dentiality of business logic A smart contract de nes the conditions that need to be met when submi ing a transaction to a ledger. is can include a list of parties that need to endorse or sign a transaction as well as pre-de ned logic that must be run to compute a valid parameter value to be commi ed. Smart contract code needs to be distributed to parties that are required to endorse ledger updates to enable them to verify independently that proposed transactions abide by the agreed-upon logic.
Installation of smart contracts on involved nodes only
Since smart contracts operate on a given ledger, the separation of ledgers means a separation of contracts, too, making them available only to members of the sub-network. Regardless of how a network is organized however, it is desirable for a DLT to be able to distribute smart contracts only to those nodes that are needed for endorsement of transactions.
O -chain execution engine Another mechanism to prevent business logic being revealed to non-involved parties, is through use of an o -chain execution engine [1] . e smart contract code then only contains functions to read from and write to the ledger. is not only prevents leaks of business logic, but also means the implementation is not bound to any particular programming language. Additional challenges to enforce simultaneous updates across all engines for a particular ledger may arise. Furthermore, some DLTs enforce participants to come to agreement on the smart contract before they can be used for transaction endorsement.
Trusted execution environments TEEs, as previously described in Section 2.2, provide an environment for the secure execution of code. In DLTs, they can be used to execute smart contracts without allowing access to the clear text version of the logic.
Design Guide
Use cases and solutions are multifaceted. Apart from use case driven privacy and con dentiality requirements, an architect may need to consider legal and regulatory constraints. Furthermore, requirements may vary between di erent types of data. is could mean that a solution needs to allow for personal data to be deleted (e.g. as per the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [10] ), or that encrypted data cannot be shared. As such, an architect may choose to implement more than one method if di erent sets of data require di erent levels of con dentiality.
Designing for privacy of interactions
Platforms o er privacy control for di erent levels of granularity that can be tailored to the privacy requirements of a use case. If a group of parties know each other, and members wish to interact privately, they may want to use a ledger that is separate from the main chain. If on any given ledger a sub-group of parties does not want to reveal that they are transacting they can exchange one-time public keys that cannot be linked directly to an identity. In the case where an individual party wishes to remain entirely private but is still required to sign or commit a transaction, they have the ability to use ZKP to prove their identity. Figure 1 aims to guide the reader in mapping transaction condentiality requirements to available mechanisms. A rst important decision point involves regulatory obligations, such as "the right to be forgo en" [10] . Since distributed ledgers inherently do not allow for the removal of entries, data need to be kept o -chain if deletion is required. Note that some ledger implementations o er the ability to "prune" the chain to allow archiving of older transactions [18] , [14] . However, archived entries are generally still available to parties on request. Given enough computing resources, encrypted data can be decrypted, which means that parties may prefer not to share even encrypted data with the wider network. If on-chain records are still desired to make use of endorsement protocols or the append-only character of a ledger, this will usually lead to the implementation of segregated ledgers with constrained membership. Additional Merkle tree tear-o s can be implemented if a transaction contains data irrelevant to one or more participating parties and must be kept private. Unless uninvolved network parties are required to endorse the correctness of an otherwise con dential transaction, segregated ledgers may more generally be the preferred solution. Note that by storing a hash of data on a shared ledger, it is recorded that a transaction occurred without revealing its content. If independent validation while keeping data con dential is desirable, uninvolved nodes can provision trusted execution environments, which provides the added bene t that business logic need not be revealed. Homomorphic computation, while not mature enough to date, may also eventually enable the processing of encrypted values. In some cases, a transaction may rely on private data that cannot be shared between transacting parties. Zero-knowledge proofs can provide boolean a rmation, for example to prove that a party has su cient funds. If a shared function needs to be computed on private values, such as a would be the case for a secret ballot, multiparty computation can be used. Most enterprise platforms are pu ing continued e ort into advancing ZKPs and MPC to make them natively available. Not captured in this diagram is the case where a node is administered by a third party that may not be trusted with raw data. In that case, transaction data can be encrypted through symmetric or asymmetric cryptography.
Designing for con dentiality of transactions

Designing for con dentiality of business logic
ere are a number of factors that may in uence the choice of mechanism to keep business logic private. Four criteria an architect may want to consider are whether an implementation (1) keeps logic private, (2) o ers in-built smart contract versioning, (3) hides data from the node administrator, and/or (4) allows for business logic to be wri en in any programming language. ere may be network con gurations in which a node is administered by a third party that should not have access to unencrypted data or business logic. For the case where contract code requires access to the con dential encrypted data, it is possible to run computations in a trusted execution environment. If this level of con dentiality is not needed but business logic remains condential, contracts can be installed only on involved nodes or alternatively can be run using a separate execution engine. A separate engine allows for the free choice of programming language, which may be especially relevant for sectors that use domain-speci c languages. However, an external engine will not bene t from the mechanism in-built to most DLT platforms that ensures that all nodes run the same version of smart contract code, meaning that version control will need to be managed outside the DLT layer. Guide to mapping con dentiality requirements on data to available techniques.
Common technical challenges
Enterprise solutions o er a variety of techniques to ensure that parties, data, and code are kept private using network design and encryption methods. However, when permissioning a platform, some other factors need to be considered that are independent of the particular DLT being used.
Ordering transactions On a distributed ledger ensuring all nodes in the network agree on the same state (or at least the part of the state they are entitled to see) is imperative. e service that provides ordering of transactions to construct a correct view of the state is an integral part of any DLT platform. For some of the platforms reviewed (Fabric and Corda), this service has visibility of all DLT events, including parties to transactions and transaction details. When assessing a DLT for suitability, architects must consider whether the ordering service meets privacy and con dentiality requirements and if parties can feasibly run their own service to mitigate leaks.
Permissioning infrastructure Ultimately, any DLT solution will need to be hosted on some organization's infrastructure, potentially exposing ledger entries and transactions to system administrators. To prevent any leak, ideally, a network should be designed such that all layers of the application (i.e. user interface, middleware, DLT) can be hosted on a per-organization level, giving each party on the network the ability to fully control their own environment. Parties should optionally be able to run a node on the cloud, choosing from a number of Blockchain-as-a-Service providers. When choosing a DLT platform for enterprise, it is useful to be aware of which cloud providers natively support the chosen solution. In cases where businesses cannot or do not wish to manage their own infrastructure, they may need to rely on an external provider, trusting a third party with maintaining privacy and con dentiality. In this way, nancial and time constraints may require an organization to compromise on privacy and/or con dentiality.
Performance and scalability e bene ts of a DLT solution become more obvious the more parties are sharing one business network. is inherently means that at some point, performance at scale of the solution will need to be assessed. While enterprise platforms commonly o er one core mechanism to protect private and con dential information, there are still unanswered questions around how these solutions scale. is is partly due to the lack of clarity on which metrics should be used in the context of permissioned DLT, and partly due to inherent di culties in comparing the di erent approaches consistently. Scalability of con dentiality preserving methods on HLF, Corda, and orum have partially been addressed in [11] , [14] , and [5] , respectively. However, when designing a solution, custom scalability tests may need to be designed to t the particular use case.
Example Use Case
A le er of credit is a nancial instrument in which a bank vouches to pay a seller if a buyer is unable to make an agreedupon payment. Parties on a DLT network used to record le ers of credit are banks, sellers, and buyers. Sellers and buyers will neither want to share that they are entering in a business relationship nor the details of their agreement with the network. Under the assumption that logic contained in a le er of credit is highly standardized and non-con dential, the design guide will lead to the following design.
Identities of parties will need to be veri ed by an independent party, most likely a bank. Since, according to GDPR regulations, any party is allowed to request deletion of personally identi able information, according to Figure 1 any such data will need to be stored o -ledger. All non-personal data will not be required to be deleted and can therefore be included in transactions. We will work under the assumption that there is no regulation against the sharing and storing of encrypted data. e solution can then be designed such that Private sequencing service possible Open source Table 1 . Comparison of permissioned DLTs with respect to privacy and con dentiality mechanisms. : native support, : not natively supported, but can be implemented, -: requires substantial rewriting of the code base. 1 Maturity level described in Section 2. transaction validators will be the parties associated with the transaction, and therefore will have the authority to view the transaction contents. According to Figure 1 , these requirements lead to a design where groups of transacting parties use a separate ledger in order to keep their interactions hidden from the wider network. If a third party is trusted to run the ordering service and have visibility of transacting parties, transaction data can be encrypted.
Enterprise Implementations
is section describes how the privacy and con dentiality mechanisms discussed in Section 2 have been implemented in three of the most prominent permissioned blockchain platforms -Hyperledger Fabric, Corda, and orum. ese DLTs were chosen because they are a) open-source, b) backed by large and active communities, and c) represent three di erent ways in which a certain level of privacy and con dentiality can be achieved. An overview of natively supported methods and extendibility of these platforms is given in Table 1 .
is section provides a point-in-time evaluation only. e teams behind included platforms are actively researching ways to improve privacy and con dentiality further, predominantly in the cryptography domain. In the coming years, it is therefore likely that there will be more native implementations of advanced cryptographic techniques such as ZKPs, homomorphic encryption, MPC, and TEEs.
Hyperledger Fabric
Fabric is an open source permissioned blockchain under the umbrella of the Linux Foundation's Hyperledger project. It was designed speci cally for enterprise use and has a strong focus on privacy and con dentiality. e primary mechanisms for privacy and con dentiality preservation is through channels, which provide a separate ledger for a subset of participants [4] . Identities of channel members are not revealed to the wider network and transactions are only shared between channel members. Con dentiality of smart contract logic, called chaincode, is provided by ensuring only peers that have the chaincode installed are able to view the chaincode. e exception to the con dentiality boundary of the channel is the service used to provide consensus on the order of transactions. In Fabric, the ordering service has full visibility of channel members as well as all transactions that are submi ed to a channel. is is a potential breach of privacy and con dentiality and is discussed in greater detail in Section 3.4. In order to mitigate the risk of leaking information, channel members can choose to run the ordering service themselves given appropriate infrastructure. Within a channel, Fabric provides privacy of parties with Idemix [8] , enabling zero-knowledge proof of identity using the public key of the issuing certi cate authority to verify the credentials rather than disclosing the identity. Con dential data is also possible between sub-groups of channel participants through Private Data Collections (PDCs), which allow for data to be kept o the channel ledger (o -chain) and referenced in transactions by hash only. However, members of PDCs are listed in associated transactions, so this method of con dentiality preservation is useful only if privacy of interaction is not required within the channel.
Corda
Corda, an open source DLT, is being developed by R3, a consortium consisting of mostly nancial institutions. Rather than globally broadcasting transactions to all peers in the network or a sub-network, Corda uses a concept of peer-to-peer transactions. e peer-to-peer nature of Corda naturally lends itself to con dentiality of data through segregation; interactions between parties are kept private, both in terms of the relationships that exist and data shared between them. If assets are to be transferred beyond the initial transacting parties, Corda allows the use of one-time public keys in transactions to further conceal identities from uninvolved parties. For situations where parties within a single transaction should not have access to all transaction data, Corda also provides support for Merkle tree tear-o s. A common scenario for this is when an oracle is needed to a est to a certain piece of data in a transaction, but the transaction participants do not want all the components of the transaction visible to the oracle. Corda provides con dentiality of business logic by separating the execution of business logic from the veri cation of valid transactions. e rules that de ne which parties are required to sign a transaction are contained in contracts associated with each state that is provided as input to a transaction. ese parties execute business logic outside of the platform to determine whether the transaction proposal is valid, giving parties the added freedom to choose a programming language to implement business logic. e on-chain contract is used to verify the transaction's signatories.
orum JPMorgan partnered with the Ethereum Enterprise Alliance to develop orum, a permissioned blockchain based on the Ethereum protocol. Its key di erentiator is the ability to store private state separate from the public ledger.
is separation of private state from public state is the primary mechanism for con dentiality of data and smart contracts. Private state and smart contracts are updated through private transactions that are distributed to all nodes in the network. However only a hash of the submi ed data is included in the transaction itself. e parties involved in the transaction receive encrypted data, which means decryption is required before a party can update their private state. One key limitation of the private transaction model in orum is that it does not prevent the double spending of assets. e contents of private transactions are shared only between speci ed parties. Since there is no global visibility of private assets, a party may spend an asset multiple times by specifying di erent receivers in separate transactions. Another major drawback of orum is that the public ledger includes private transactions, including the list of participants of the transaction, revealing to the entire network which parties are interacting.
Conclusion
From transparent execution of smart contracts to increased data integrity and availability, DLT has the potential to provide a new framework for the way collaborative business processes are conducted. However, business interactions can contain highly sensitive information, including personal data, and a leak thereof could have large economic impact. Any enterprise use case may require that privacy of interacting entities be preserved and that both the data and the business logic that de ne how data are updated and kept condential. In DLT implementations, these requirements will likely determine how the network is structured and what privacy and con dentiality mechanisms can be deployed. is paper lays out relevant key mechanisms for meeting said requirements, covering segmentation and encryption techniques. It further gives the reader a guide to both dene their particular needs and discover possible solutions. To illustrate how the mechanisms are applied in current DLTs, this paper described how three representative DLTs for enterprise implement privacy and con dentiality. Apart from native support in existing enterprise solutions, nancial restrictions, scalability of a solution, and infrastructure administration may also play an important role in realizing the ideal solution.
